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Abstract - In implementing trade policy measures, 
governments usually select from a range of instruments 
including quotas, subsidies (explicit or implicit) and tariffs. 
In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government 
pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, 
along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a three-
step game between home and foreign countries in the 
Cournot duopoly. The paper demonstrates that two-part 
trade policy is dominant. 
Keywords - strategic trade policy, Nash equilibrium, tariffs, 
quotas, subsidies. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Surveys have repeatedly shown strong support among 
economists for free trade policies who state that “The 
consensus among mainstream economists on the 
desirability of free trade remains almost universal”.  
Despite this, trade barriers still exist and generally take the 
form of tariffs, quotas, non-tariff barriers and voluntary 
export restraints (VER’s).  In this paper, we consider the 
implementation of a two-part trade policy.  The basic 
model is a two level game.  At the first level each 
government implements its trade policy and at the second 
level, producers in both countries behave as Cournot 
competitors. 
We use our model to demonstrate that a two part trade 
policy offers the authorities a superior outcome over a one 
part strategy and that a one part trade policy, consisting of 
a simple quota or simple tariff, is simply a special case of a 
two part policy.  We show that the effectiveness of the two 
part trade strategy depends on the number of competing 
firms in the market, the degree of heterogeneity between 
cost functions, the degree of convexity of cost functions 
(and therefore which firms the policy will apply to) and the 
aims of the governments implementing the trade policy. 
The classical problem in the theory of the policies of 
international trade concerns the effect of the tariffs and 
quotas or the effect of a variety of possible policies. In 
absolutely competitive models of trade, tariffs and quotas - 
are usually equivalent, that is the effect of the tariff can be 
duplicated by the accordingly chose model of quota. As it 
is stated by Bhagwati [1], it will not be true at imperfect 
competition. He has demonstrated, that the tariffs dominate 
above the quotas, when there is an imperfect competition 
in home market. It can be explained by the fact that the keen 
response of foreign firms at the quota is more exact, than at 
the tariff. Thus, the quota in comparison with the tariff 
raises monopolistic force of internal firms. Anderson [2] 
considered the duopoly model and showed, that under the 
certain conditions quotas tend to lower competition. 
Krishna [3] has shown in model of a Bertrand, that the 
quota constrains the ability of firms to compete effectively, 
when the goods are perfect substitutes. Accordingly, we 
could expect some interesting comparisons between the 
tariffs and quotas as strategic instrumental means of trade 
policy. The analysis of the quotas at oligopoly give 
additional penetrations.  
Brander and Spencer [4] were the first to use an 
oligopoly model to explain export subsidies.  They showed 
that when one home firm and one foreign firm produce a 
homogenous product and compete in a third market, an 
export subsidy is optimal in shifting monopoly rent from 
foreign to domestic firms.  They demonstrate this finding 
in a Cournot model with constant returns to scale 
technology.  Eaton and Grossman [5] extend paper [4] by 
replicating their analysis in a Bertrand model and show that 
a government in one of the first two countries has a 
unilateral incentive to impose export taxes (not subsidies) 
on its home firm.  This tax allows the home firm to commit 
to a higher price (or act as a Stackelberg leader) and thus 
obtain higher profits for its country.  Then, they confirm 
that when the governments of the first two countries can 
both credibly pre-commit to a policy, exporting 
governments optimally set taxes (not subsidies) in a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under the Bertrand 
market structure.  Eaton and Grossman [5] therefore broke 
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new ground by showing that the outcome of policy is 
sensitive to the nature of competition between firms. 
The two-part trade policy provides for considering the 
import license for an entrance alongside with the tariff for 
the unit of import. Such policy was first introduced by Oi 
[6] in the classical analysis of a price dilemma of 
Disneyland. Philips [7] and Wilson [8] also considered the 
examples of nonlinear assigning of the prices. For the case 
of sole market with homogeneous functions of costs, Fuerst 
and Kim [9] have considered the two-part trade policy at 
complete, but imperfect information. In the market model 
of one country with homogeneous  functions of costs they 
have found conditions, when the optimal two-part trade 
policy dominates above the simple tariff and simple quota. 
It is also fair both for a government, which is interested 
only in maximization of the income, and for benevolent 
government interested in internal welfare. The effect arises 
because the large payment for the import license imposes a 
smaller amount of distortions, than tariff. A government 
can reach the neutral income, reducing current tariffs and 
reimbursing the lost incomes by the payment for the 
license. With inhomogeneous functions of costs Fuerst and 
Kim [9] have considered numerical examples, which also 
have shown advantage of the two-part trade policy. 
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
In this paper we consider a two part trade policy in a 
model with reciprocal markets. In the model, there are two 
countries with N domestic firms and M foreign firms 
producing a homogenous product. Suppose 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 is the output 
of the i firm for the domestic market and 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗ is the level of 
exports of the i firm to the foreign market. Similarly, 
suppose 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗  that is the level of exports to the domestic 
market by a foreign firm, j and 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗∗ is the output of firm j for 
the foreign market. The total sales in both the home market 
and the foreign market, Q and Q* respectively, as in (1) and 
(2).  
                  𝑄𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1                             (1) 
                 𝑄𝑄∗ = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗ + ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗∗𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1                           (2) 
Demand is a function of price and firms face the usual 
inverse demand curves in both markets.  Specifically, in the 
home market we have 𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄) and in the foreign market we 
have 𝑃𝑃∗(𝑄𝑄∗)  where   𝑝𝑝 , 𝑝𝑝∗ ∈ 𝐶𝐶2 , 𝑝𝑝′ < 0, (𝑝𝑝∗)′ < 0 . It is 
also known 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) is the cost function of the i home firm 
and 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗∗�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗∗� is the cost function of the j foreign firm, where 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗∗ ∈ 𝐶𝐶2 ,   and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖′ > 0, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖′′ > 0, �𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗∗�
′ > 0, �𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗∗�
′′ > 0  . 
(𝐶𝐶2 - set of  twice continuously differentiable functions).  
We assume that firms aim to maximise profit and their 
output decisions are therefore guided by their profit 
functions, as in (3) and (4).  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝(𝑄𝑄)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗) + 𝑝𝑝∗(𝑄𝑄∗)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝑡𝑡∗𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗ −
                             𝑒𝑒∗,   𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑁𝑁                                (3) 
𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝑝𝑝∗(𝑄𝑄∗)𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗∗ − 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗∗�𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 + 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗∗� + 𝑝𝑝(𝑄𝑄)𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 − 𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 −
                              𝑒𝑒,   𝑗𝑗 = 1, …𝑀𝑀                                (4) 
In (3) and (4) e and  𝑒𝑒∗ are payments for the license to 
home and foreign governments respectively and t and 𝑡𝑡∗  
are the tariff per unit of sales imposed on home and foreign 
firms respectively.  
We designate the two part trade policies of the home 
and foreign governments by the vectors, as in (5) and (6). 
                                  𝑧𝑧 = (𝑒𝑒, ?̅?𝑣, 𝑡𝑡)                            (5) 
                                𝑧𝑧∗ = (𝑒𝑒∗, 𝑞𝑞�, 𝑡𝑡∗)                         (6) 
In (5) and (6)  𝑞𝑞�, ?̅?𝑣  are the quotas on home and foreign. 
This description of trade policy incorporates the standard 
quota and tariff policy. For example, simple quota is (7). 
Similarly, a simple tariff is (8).  
                         𝑧𝑧 = 𝑧𝑧𝑣𝑣 ≡ (𝑒𝑒, ?̅?𝑣, 0)                            (7) 
                         𝑧𝑧 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 ≡ (0,∞, 𝑡𝑡)                            (8) 
In the analysis of strategic trade policy, the third-market 
model is well known [4], [5]. In this model one or more 
firms from a domestic country and one or more firms from 
a foreign country compete only in the third market. Firms 
therefore produce only for export to the third market. This 
simplification is very useful in analysing the strategic 
effects of trade policy since neither government (domestic 
nor foreign) can implement direct trade policies (tariffs or 
quotas) which impact upon the behaviour of firms in the 
third market.  The natural choice of policy instrument is 
therefore an export subsidy which gives the domestic firm 
a competitive advantage over its foreign rival.  However, in 
this paper we show that a two-part trade policy, consisting 
of a negative tariff (subsidy) and a quota license, is optimal.  
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We construct a two stage model; in keeping with much 
of the literature on strategic trade policy [4]. We analyse 
behaviour in a Cournot model.  In the first stage of our 
model, the domestic government implements a two-part 
trade policy for domestic firms. At the second stage an 
interior and an exterior firm simultaneously choose an 
output level (or export) for the third market. In the second 
stage we use an inverse induction to find a perfect subgame 
Nash equilibrium.  We then consider Nash equilibrium 
between governments in the first stage and we show that 
their respective trade policies impact on output levels of 
firms in the second stage.  The payoff functions of firms 𝑖𝑖,
𝑗𝑗 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑁𝑁, 𝑗𝑗 = 1 …𝑀𝑀) are defined by relations, as in (9) 
and (10).  
            𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝(𝑄𝑄)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) − 𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑒                    (9) 
         𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝑝𝑝(𝑄𝑄)𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 − 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗∗�𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗� − 𝑡𝑡∗𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 − 𝑒𝑒∗                (10) 
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In (9) and (10) e and  𝑒𝑒∗ are the payments for the license 
to home and foreign government respectively, t and  𝑡𝑡∗  are 
the tariff per unit of production imposed on home and 
foreign firms respectively.  We also impose a restriction on 
the model that cost functions are homogenous and are of 
the form 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞) = 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞),∀𝑖𝑖;  𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗∗(𝑣𝑣) = 𝑐𝑐∗(𝑣𝑣),∀𝑗𝑗.  
By stage 2, tariffs t and  𝑡𝑡∗have been predetermined in 
stage 1 and are therefore treated as exogenous. The first 
order conditions associated with maximization of (9) and  
(10), as in (11) and (12). 
                 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝′𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐′ − 𝑡𝑡 = 0                 (11) 




= 𝑝𝑝′𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 + 𝑝𝑝 − (𝑐𝑐∗)′ − 𝑡𝑡∗ = 0            (12) 
The second order conditions associated with 
maximization of (9) and (10), as in (13) and (14). 
           𝜕𝜕
2𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
2 = 𝑝𝑝′′𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝′ + 𝑝𝑝′ − 𝑐𝑐′′ < 0                 (13) 




2 = 𝑝𝑝′′𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝′ + 𝑝𝑝′ − (𝑐𝑐∗)′′ < 0               (14) 
The first order condition (11), (12) makes it clear that a 
Cournot equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in outputs since 
(11), (12) is implied by the Nash condition for the case in 
which each player's strategy set is simply the set of possible 
output quantities that might produce in a one-shot 
simultaneous-move game. The Cournot equilibrium 
therefore has the same ‘no surprises’ rationality property 
that any Nash equilibrium has. The first order condition 
(11), (12) could be solved in principle for the profit-
maximizing choice of   for any given set of output choices 
by the other firms. This resulting implicit function is the 
reaction function or best-response function. The    common 
intersection of the best-response functions (one for each 
firm) is the Cournot equilibrium.  
An additional regularity condition that turns out to be 
central to the characterization of the Cournot equilibrium, 
as in (15) and (16). 
                         𝜕𝜕
2𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗
= 𝑝𝑝′′𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝′ < 0                 (15) 




= 𝑝𝑝′′𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 + 𝑝𝑝′ < 0                 (16) 
Condition (15), (16)  is linked to many properties of the 
Cournot model.  It is the so-called Hahn stability condition 
for certain proposed dynamic adjustment mechanisms and 
it implies that each firm's marginal revenue declines as the 
output of any other firm rises. (Note, however, that the pure 
Cournot model is a one-shot static game with no real-time 
dynamics. Any proposed dynamic adjustment is an 
extension to the model). Presuming that second order 
conditions are globally satisfied, global satisfaction of (15), 
(16)  in this context is also the Gale-Nikaido condition for 
uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium. Condition (15), 
(16) also ensures that the various comparative static 
properties of the model are ‘well-behaved’.  
Most importantly, condition (15), (16)  implies that 
strategy variables 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  and 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 , are strategic substitutes. If 
𝜕𝜕2𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗
< 0,∀𝑖𝑖  , this implies that the marginal value, 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
 of 
increasing firm i strategy variable, decreases when the 
strategy variable of a rival increases.  
The solution to the first order conditions will yield 𝑞𝑞1 
and 𝑣𝑣1  as functions of tariffs t and  𝑡𝑡∗ . The comparative 








   can be obtained by totally 
differentiating the first order conditions (11), (12) with 
respect to 𝑞𝑞1 , 𝑣𝑣1, t and 𝑡𝑡∗ , as in (17) and (18). 
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These equations can be solved using Cramer’s 
rule, as in (19) - (22).  








2                              (19) 








                         (20) 







                        (21) 







2                            (22) 
D is the determinant of the left-hand matrix in (17) and 
(18), as in (23). 














> 0            (23) 
From (13) – (16) we get the conditions, as in (24). 
                𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡




 > 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡∗
< 0           (24) 
Thus we have proved a Lemma.  
Lemma 1.  Suppose that: 
1) the cost functions c1(q)  and c1∗(q)    are twice 
continuously differentiable and convex, for any q ≥ 0; 
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2) the inverse demand curve p(Q)  is twice continuously 
differentiable and decrease, for any Q ≥ 0 ; 
3) the function  p�q + Q�� ∙ q is concave in q, for any   Q� ≥











 , where β ∈ (−1,0).  
Proof:   Let 𝑞𝑞�1(𝑣𝑣1) and 𝑣𝑣�1(𝑞𝑞1)  be the domestic firm’s 
best response and the foreign firm’s best response 
respectively. 
Using conditions 1)-3) of Lemma 1 the first-order 
condition, as in (25).  






′′ = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼(−1,0)              (25) 
Next, we have conditions, as in (26). 








                   (26) 
It is similarly proved that  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡∗
= 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
 , where 𝛽𝛽 ∈
(−1,0)  . Proved. 
As the basic model we shall consider the two stage 
game with complete, but imperfect information. In the first 
stage, players 1 and 2 (the home and foreign governments 
respectively) simultaneously choose their strategy and 
inform their respective home and foreign firms (players 3 
and 4) which in the second stage simultaneously choose 
their strategy.  
Let's designate 𝑥𝑥1 = (𝑒𝑒, ?̅?𝑣, 𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝑋𝑋1  and 𝑥𝑥2 =
(𝑒𝑒∗, 𝑞𝑞�, 𝑡𝑡∗) ∈ 𝑋𝑋2 as the strategies of the first and the second 
players respectively, where 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 = 𝑅𝑅+ × 𝑅𝑅+ × 𝑅𝑅 is the  set 
of strategy k of the player (k=1,2).  Let 𝑥𝑥3 = 𝑞𝑞1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋3   be 
the strategy of player 3 and 𝑥𝑥4 = 𝑣𝑣1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋4  be the strategy 
of  player 4, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅+ × 𝑅𝑅+ is the  set of strategy i of the 
player (i=1,2).  Let's designate 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑋𝑋1 × 𝑋𝑋2 × 𝑋𝑋3 ×
𝑋𝑋4. 
Let's define the functions, as in (27) - (30).  
       𝑓𝑓1(𝑥𝑥) ≡ 𝑝𝑝 ∙ 𝑞𝑞1(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗) − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞1(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗)�                (27) 
      𝑓𝑓2(𝑥𝑥) ≡ 𝑝𝑝 ∙ 𝑣𝑣1(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗) − 𝑐𝑐∗�𝑣𝑣1(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗)�                (28) 
                        𝑓𝑓3(𝑥𝑥) ≡ 𝜋𝜋1(𝑥𝑥)                                (29) 
                        𝑓𝑓4(𝑥𝑥) ≡ 𝜋𝜋1∗(𝑥𝑥)                                (30) 
Then it is possible to define the two-stage game for 4 
players with complete, but imperfect, information, as in 
(31).  
          Γ = 〈𝐼𝐼 = {1,2.3.4}, {𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝐼 , {𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)}𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝐼〉         (31) 
The following existence theorem of Nash equilibrium 
in game Γ is fair.  
Theorem 1.  Suppose that: 
1) the cost functions c1(q)  and c1∗(q)    are twice 
continuously differentiable and convex, for any q ≥ 0; 
2) the inverse demand curve p(Q)  is twice continuously 
differentiable and decrease, for any Q ≥ 0 ; 
3) the function  p�q + Q�� ∙ q is concave in q, for any   Q� ≥
0;  
4) ∃Q�, that p(Q) = 0, ∀Q ≥ Q� , 
then in game Γ  there exists a perfect subgame Nash 
equilibrium. 
Proof:   I) Taking into account the imposing of quota 
by  𝑞𝑞1  and  𝑣𝑣1  we get that  𝑞𝑞1 ∈ [0, 𝑞𝑞�], 𝑣𝑣1 ∈ [0, ?̅?𝑣] . Thus 
maximization 𝜋𝜋1 by 𝑞𝑞1 can be considered as a compact set 
𝑋𝑋3 = [0, 𝑞𝑞�]  and maximization 𝜋𝜋1∗ by 𝑣𝑣1  by   is a compact 
set  𝑋𝑋4 = [0, ?̅?𝑣].   
II) By conditions 1), 2) of Theorem 1.  Functions 
𝜋𝜋1(𝑞𝑞1, 𝑣𝑣1)  and 𝜋𝜋1∗(𝑞𝑞1, 𝑣𝑣1)   are continuous.  
III) As according to the conditions 1) - 3) of Theorem 
1.  the theorems guarantee the conditions, as in (32) and 
(33). 
          𝜕𝜕
2𝜋𝜋1
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1
2 = 𝑝𝑝′′𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 2𝑝𝑝′ − 𝑐𝑐′′ < 0                 (32) 




2 = 𝑝𝑝′′𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 2𝑝𝑝′ − (𝑐𝑐∗)′′ < 0               (33) 
The conditions (32), (33) guarantee concavity of the 
functions  𝜋𝜋1(𝑞𝑞1, 𝑣𝑣1)  and 𝜋𝜋1∗(𝑞𝑞1, 𝑣𝑣1).  
IV) Thus, from I), II), III) and the Nash theorem implies 
that there exists a Cournot equilibrium 
〈𝑞𝑞10(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗), 𝑣𝑣10(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗)〉  in the second stage of the game. 
To see how this result is obtained, we first consider the 
first stage of the game between governments.  We need to 
demonstrate that theorem 1 also guarantees the existence of 
a Nash equilibrium in the first stage of the game, and 
consequently the existence of the perfect subgame Nash 
equilibrium, which determines the optimum two-part trade 
policy.  
V) To do this we first demonstrate that the problem of 
maximization 𝑓𝑓1(𝑥𝑥) by t can be considered as a segment 
(compact set) 𝑋𝑋1 = [𝑡𝑡н, 𝑡𝑡в]  and the problem of 
maximization 𝑓𝑓2(𝑥𝑥)by 𝑡𝑡∗ can be considered as a segment 
(compact set)  𝑋𝑋2 = [𝑡𝑡н∗, 𝑡𝑡в∗]  . This fact emerges 
immediately from the continuity and limitation of the 
functions 𝑞𝑞1(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗) and 𝑣𝑣1(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗). 
VI) Since 𝑝𝑝(𝑄𝑄) ∈ 𝐶𝐶2; 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞) ∈ 𝐶𝐶2 and 𝑐𝑐∗(𝑣𝑣) ∈ 𝐶𝐶2, then 
the functions  𝑓𝑓1(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗) and 𝑓𝑓2(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗)are continuous.  
VII) Further, we can prove concavity of the functions  
𝑓𝑓1(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗) and 𝑓𝑓2(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗) by t and 𝑡𝑡∗  .  
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      (34) 
Using Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 and if 𝑝𝑝′′ < 0 ,  then the 




= (𝑝𝑝′′𝑣𝑣1 ∙ (𝛼𝛼 + 1)2 + 2𝑝𝑝′ ∙ (1 + 𝛼𝛼) −




< 0                              (35) 
if  𝑝𝑝′′ ≥ 0  then the estimation is fair, as in (36). 
𝜕𝜕2𝑓𝑓1(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡∗)
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡2





≤ (𝑝𝑝′′ ∙ 𝑞𝑞 + 𝑝𝑝′) ∙ (1 + 𝛼𝛼) +
                        +𝑝𝑝′(1 + 𝛼𝛼) − 𝑐𝑐′′ < 0                       (36) 
The function 𝑓𝑓1(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗) is therefore concave by t. Similarly 
we obtain a concavity for the function 𝑓𝑓2(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗)  by 𝑡𝑡∗ .  
VIII) So, from V), VI) and VII) and the Nash theorem 
implies that there is Nash equilibrium in the first stage of 
the game (𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0)  . It also follows from IV) and VIII) that 
in the game Γ , there exists perfect subgame Nash 
equilibrium, as in (37).  
𝑋𝑋0 = 〈(𝑒𝑒0, 𝑞𝑞�0, 𝑡𝑡0), (𝑒𝑒∗0, ?̅?𝑣0, 𝑡𝑡∗0), 𝑞𝑞10(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗), 𝑣𝑣10(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗)〉, 
𝑒𝑒∗0 = 𝑝𝑝�𝑞𝑞10(𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0) + 𝑣𝑣10(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗0)� ∙ 𝑞𝑞10(𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0) −
𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞10(𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0)� − 𝑡𝑡0 ∙ 𝑞𝑞10(𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0),  
𝑒𝑒0 = 𝑝𝑝�𝑞𝑞10(𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0) + 𝑣𝑣10(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡∗0)� ∙ 𝑣𝑣10(𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0) −
𝑐𝑐∗�𝑣𝑣10(𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0)� − 𝑡𝑡0 ∙ 𝑣𝑣10(𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0),  
        ?̅?𝑣0 = 𝑣𝑣10(𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0), 𝑞𝑞�0 = 𝑞𝑞10(𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡∗0)               (37) 
Proved.  
From theorem 1 we derive a remarkable corollary. 
Corollary 2.  In the third-market model the optimum two-
part tariff t which maximizes the government’s revenue is 
negative, that is, a subsidy, and the optimum payment for 
the license is equal to the level of foreign profits.  
 We consider the third market model in Example 1 
below.  
Example 1. In this example we assume the existence of 
one market, two governments and two firms. We assume 
an inverse demand function of the form, as in (38). 
                      𝑝𝑝(𝑄𝑄) = 1 − 𝑄𝑄                                  (38) 
The cost functions of home and foreign firms are given, 
as in (39). 
              𝐶𝐶(𝑄𝑄) = 𝑐𝑐 ∙ 𝑞𝑞,𝐶𝐶∗(𝑞𝑞) = 𝑐𝑐∗ ∙ 𝑞𝑞                    (39) 
To derive the optimum two-part trade policy we apply 
the method of inverse induction. Thus we consider the 
various combinations of applying or not applying the two-
part trade policies by different governments.  
The outcomes are given in TABLE I which shows that 
the optimum two-part trade policy is the subsidy at the 
positive payment for the license. 
TABLE I. 

















𝐺𝐺 = 0;𝐺𝐺∗ = 0; 
𝜋𝜋 = 1
9
(1 − 2𝑐𝑐 + 𝑐𝑐∗)2; 
𝜋𝜋∗ = 1
9
(1− 2𝑐𝑐∗ + 𝑐𝑐)2; 
𝑞𝑞 = 1
3
(1 − 2𝑐𝑐 + 𝑐𝑐∗); 
𝑞𝑞∗ = 1
3
(1 − 2𝑐𝑐∗ + 𝑐𝑐); 
𝑡𝑡 = 0; 𝑡𝑡∗ = 0; 
𝑒𝑒 = 0; 𝑒𝑒∗ = 0; 
𝐺𝐺 = 1
8
(1 − 2𝑐𝑐 + 𝑐𝑐∗)2; 
𝐺𝐺∗ = 0; 
𝜋𝜋 = 0; 
𝜋𝜋∗ = 1
16
(1 − 3𝑐𝑐∗ + 2𝑐𝑐)2; 
𝑞𝑞 = 1
2
(1 − 2𝑐𝑐 + 𝑐𝑐∗); 
𝑞𝑞∗ = 1
4
(1 − 3𝑐𝑐∗ + 2𝑐𝑐); 
𝑡𝑡 = −1
4
(1 − 2𝑐𝑐 + 𝑐𝑐∗); 
𝑡𝑡∗ = 0; 
𝑒𝑒 = 1
4
(1− 2𝑐𝑐 + 𝑐𝑐∗)2; 








𝐺𝐺 = 0; 
𝐺𝐺∗ = 1
8
(1 − 2𝑐𝑐∗ + 𝑐𝑐)2; 
𝜋𝜋 = 1
16
(1− 3𝑐𝑐 + 2𝑐𝑐∗)2; 
 𝜋𝜋∗ = 0; 
𝑞𝑞 = 1
4
(1 − 3𝑐𝑐 + 2𝑐𝑐∗); 
𝑞𝑞∗ = 1
2
(1 − 2𝑐𝑐∗ + 𝑐𝑐); 
𝑡𝑡 = 0; 
𝑡𝑡∗ = −1
4
(1 − 2𝑐𝑐∗ + 𝑐𝑐); 
𝑒𝑒 = 0; 
𝑒𝑒∗ = 1
4
(1− 2𝑐𝑐∗ + 𝑐𝑐)2; 
𝐺𝐺 = 2
25
(1− 3𝑐𝑐∗ + 2𝑐𝑐)2; 
𝐺𝐺∗ = 2
25
(1− 3𝑐𝑐 + 2𝑐𝑐∗)2; 
𝜋𝜋 = 0; 𝜋𝜋∗ = 0; 
𝑞𝑞 = 2
5
(1 − 3𝑐𝑐∗ + 2𝑐𝑐); 
𝑞𝑞∗ = 2
5
(1 − 3𝑐𝑐 + 2𝑐𝑐∗); 
𝑡𝑡 = −1
5
(1 − 3𝑐𝑐 + 2𝑐𝑐∗); 
𝑡𝑡∗ = −1
5
(1 − 3𝑐𝑐∗ + 2𝑐𝑐); 
𝑒𝑒 = 4
25
(1− 3𝑐𝑐∗ + 2𝑐𝑐); 
𝑒𝑒 = 4
25
(1− 3𝑐𝑐 + 2𝑐𝑐∗); 
It is also interesting to note that if the two-part trade 
policy is applied by only one government, the optimum rate 
of subsidy is increased because of the home firm’s relative 
advantage. A subsidy also encourages the home firm to act 
more aggressively because of the competitive advantage 
given by the subsidy.  As a result it captures more its 
foreign rival’s market and output of the rival therefore 
contracts.  The optimal domestic subsidy moves the 
domestic firm to Stackelberg leader output level, while the 
foreign firm produces the Stackelberg follower output. In 
effect, the government is able to convert its first-mover 
advantage into an equivalent advantage for the domestic 
firm.  
If the two-part policy is applied by both governments, 
their optimum policy still will be the subsidy at the optimal 
licensing fee is equal to the operating profits of the foreign 
firm.  However, where the government aims to maximize 
welfare ( 𝐺𝐺 + 𝜋𝜋1  and 𝐺𝐺∗ + 𝜋𝜋1∗  )  a classic prisoner’s 
dilemma situation emerges since both countries are in a 
worse position in a position as a result of implementing a 
strategic trade policy than if they both adopt free trade, yet 
each country has an incentive to deviate from the free trade 
option.  




In this paper we analyse the simultaneous use by 
government of quotas (and corresponding license fees) and 
tariffs. The use of quotas and tariffs as complements rather 
than substitutes enables us to identify a trade policy that 
dominates in terms of efficiency over other trade policy 
instruments. The qualitative outcomes of analysis depend 
on the type of government (whether it maximizes its 
revenue or public welfare), market structure and the cost 
structure of firms operating in the market.  
We have shown that the two-part trade policy 
dominates the simple quota and simple tariff, and that the 
latter two are special cases of a two part trade policy.  
We show that for the third-market model, the optimal 
two-part trade policy is a subsidy. For this case the 
analytical results (Lemma 1 and Theorem 1) are obtained. 
In this part of our paper we investigated the properties of 
cost functions and inverse demand functions which define 
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